A REAPPROPRIATION OF HEGEL:
IS SITTLICHKEIT ALL IT’S
CRACKED UP TO BE?
Thomas Moore
All too often, Hegel is falsely characterized. For some,
he is precisely what his philosophical adversary Arthur
Schopenhauer said: a “shallow, witless charlatan” whose
“wretched sophisms” and “senseless twaddle of proofs” are
the pinnacle of “sham philosophy.” 1 For others, he is the
predecessor to totalitarianism, the forerunner of German
fascism, who was able to not only anticipate, but justify state
oppression of critics and the underprivileged. 2 Yet despite
these charges, Georg F. W. Hegel is still taken seriously by
academia today; his great texts, still studied and discussed,
frequently enter into dialogue with the deliberations over
state-building today. Crucial to understanding both his
perplexity and his appeal is the political philosophy he
articulates in his 1821 work Elements of the Philosophy of
Right, which attempts to lay the groundwork for a conception
of an ethical life that allows people within the State to find
freedom and liberation in a way that avoids hindering others,
and elevates peoples’ status in an objective, rational way. In
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this paper, I will examine Hegel’s political thought in an effort
to vindicate him from false accusations and provide a better
frame for engagement with his work.
Rooted in an incomplete understanding and of his
formulation of the state, the charge that Hegel’s political
thought is totalitarian is false; nevertheless, as his words may
strike contemporary readers as perplexing — or outright
alarming — an exploration of his thought is necessary to
vindicate him. In his 1821 work, Elements of the Philosophy
of Right, Hegel asserts the following:
Similarly, in the state, as the objectivity of the concept
of reason, legal responsibility [die gerichtliche
Zurechnung] must not stop at what the individual
considers to be in conformity with his reason or
otherwise, or at his subjective insight into rightness or
wrongness, good or evil, or at what he may require in
order to satisfy his conviction.3
For Hegel, since the state is objective form of the concept of
reason, the legal responsibility it has to its citizens is not
contingent on what certain individuals within society see as
reasonable. If the state truly is reason made manifest, those
who object to the rational laws set forth by the state are acting
irrationally. To some, this model appears to imply that social
critics and reformers are irrational and should be regarded as
irrelevant, as they are failing to live up to moral living.
A challenging question can be raised here: if critics of
the state are failing to live up to proper moral living, what
should we make of reformers like Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.
and Mahatma Gandhi? On this model, they seem to be an
obstacle to society’s well-being. Should we think Hegel is
opposed to them? Or, is he able to countenance reformers’
immanent critique of the state they inhabit? In this paper, I will
3
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argue that Hegel can support social critiques and that
Sittlichkeit — his conception of ethical life — actually
requires social reformers to promote moral progress and
uphold the welfare of society. Ideally, I will offer a way to
salvage Hegel’s thought from being falsely appropriated by
totalitarian thinkers, and demonstrate how Hegel is more
welcoming to the idea of social reform as a rational action —
and moral duty — than the purely duty-based slavishness to
the state with which he is often associated.
I shall advance my argument in steps. First, I shall
examine what Hegel’s view appears to be and explain the
basic concepts necessary to understanding his political
philosophy with regards to state building and social
responsibility. In particular, this section will show how Hegel
resolves concepts that typically seem in tension with one
another, revealing them to be complementary, rather than
antithetical. Next, I will propose the endeavors and critiques
of great moral exemplars as challenges to framing Hegel as a
social justice advocate. Following that, I shall demonstrate
how Hegel actually does not disregard social reformers as
irrational, irrelevant beings, but instead requires them for
developing the state to its full potential. Penultimately, I shall
consider objections to my defense of Hegel. Finally, I shall
respond to those objections and conclude that people who hold
social reformers in high esteem can take Hegel and Sittlichkeit
seriously, and regard his political thought as a route to
objective freedom that supports social justice reforms.
Hegel’s apparent view in Philosophy of Right is that
dissidents and social reformers are irrational beings who are
not at home in their communities because they do not act in
accordance with the standards of their state. Vindicating Hegel
of this charge — and making sense of his thought in general
— requires a proper examination of what he means by
Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is essentially the idea that each
respective person is who he/she is only because of the society
that created him/her and which preserves and fosters his/her
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identity.4 Hegel posits that all people are not purely individual,
autonomous beings. 5 Man is a political animal; always
situated in a community, our identities are constituted by the
state we are born into.6 Each state has history and tradition
behind it; the cultural aspects and societal norms of our society
shape its people as they develop.7 As Hegel puts it, “Since the
determinations of ethics constitute the concept of freedom,
they are the substantiality or universal essence of individuals,
who are related to them merely as accidents. Whether the
individual exists or not is a matter of indifference to objective
ethical life.” 8 Consequently, Hegel argues that we find
individual contentment and freedom when we conform to
societal standards.9
Since the state we are born into is what gives us our
identity, Hegel proposes that we are forever indebted to the
state; accordingly, the state deserves some gratitude. 10 By
fulfilling our obligations, both to our fellow-citizens and the
state that protects us, we manifest two of life’s most important
tasks: building identity through others and giving meaning to
our existence. “All these substantial determinations,” Hegel
writes, “are duties which are binding on the will of the
individual, as subjective and inherently undetermined — or
4
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determined in a particular way — is distinct from them and
consequently stands in a relationship to them as his own
substantial being.”11 Without duties to fulfill, without rational
norms to uphold, without others to serve and help, people
stand not only unfulfilled, but undetermined; one’s being is
wrapped up in others who give it meaning, and it is through
service that we build relationships and cultivate purpose.
Because we owe the state payment for it granting us life and
the ability to shape our identity, we must necessarily conform
with its norms.12 Since the norms that have been actualized are
rational (for they are actual), for a person in a state not to
conform with that society’s standards is to act irrationally.13
For Hegel, complete freedom is found by actualizing
one’s individuality through the other, which is in turn
actualized by fulfilling the objective standards posited by the
rational state which constitutes him/her. 14 “The right of
individuals to their subjective determination to freedom,” he
writes, “is fulfilled insofar as they belong to ethical
actuality.” 15 On this understanding, freedom is not the
libertarian ability to do as one pleases: to be objective,
freedom and independence must have rational meaning. Hegel
points out that if you act irrationally or egotistically, you are
not free — you are chained, either to the shadow cast by
ignorance that veils your mind, the selfish passions of your
heart, or the appetitive desires of your gut.16 For instance, if
you choose to smoke cigarettes but then become addicted, you
are not actually free to choose if you want to smoke them —
11
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you are simply fettered to the nicotine, and must satisfy your
body’s chemical cravings.
Yet bodily desires are not the only ways individual
freedom is lost to subjectivity: decisions that seem rational but
are bound up with arbitrary whims also result in bondage. For
example, people who conform to social norms to be accepted
are arbitrarily dependent on others for self-worth; they miss
the mark of objective social independence. Thus, following
arbitrary subjective standards to actualize your interests is
actually denying your individuality, and by extension, your
freedom. The true way to actualize your freedom and act
independently is to act in accordance with rational standards
that have been actualized by the rational state which
constitutes you. Although to some duty appears to restrict our
natural desires, Hegel concludes that “in duty the individual
finds his liberation . . . from mere natural impulse . . . In duty
the individual acquires his substantive freedom.”17
As pointed out by the scholar Tanja Staehler, the
world we are born into predates us and acts as a “meaningful
context...determined by senses, atmospheres, and ideals.”18
Illustrating this fact, British philosopher F. H. Bradley
observes that as a child grows up in the world, he does not
think of himself as a separate entity; he develops with the
world around him, and his identity matures as develops
through his friendships, relationships, interests, and
experiences. 19 The language he learns to communicate with
his community has been passed down by generations of
ancestors, and the definitions express the same sentiments and
ideas that his ancestors posited. His/her soul feels emotion
when the symbols of his/her culture prompt it. Society thus
makes its members feel that their identity is determined by
17
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serving in that community. Noted scholar Peter Singer
provides a helpful example of what the state and society at
large thus require of its members. A member of a community
is like a body’s limbs: the limbs act in accordance with what
the brain commands. The brain is responding to the heart
which sustains it. Arms and legs do not have brains in
themselves and cannot decide for themselves what they desire.
The limbs’ serve the stomach in various ways, and in turn the
stomach keeps the heart pumping and brain rationalizing.20
Since it is the state we are born into that constitutes
our identity and existence, the standards and laws of the state
are the only ways we can truly express our individuality. If the
state is rational, we can only be rational beings if we act in
accordance with the standards of the state. Thus, the laws of
the state are actually a form of freedom. We would not be who
we are without the spirit of the rational state; accordingly, to
act contrary to that is to act erroneously or subjectively. As
Hegel articulates,
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these
determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality.
In this way, the ethical sphere is freedom...whose
moments...govern the lives of individuals. In these
individuals — who are accidental to them — these
powers have their representation [Vorstellung],
phenomenal shape [erscheinende Gestalt], and
actuality.21
Sittlichkeit describes how a citizen can know his/her duties
because social existence constitutes and determines right
behavior. 22 These duties will be rational when they are
“actual” and not merely “abstract.” Effectively, one can only
20
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act freely when he/she is totally sure he/she is acting
rationally: in other words, acting in accordance with the values
set by the rational state.23 For Hegel, “Ethical life is the Idea
of Freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and
volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through selfconscious action.” 24 The individual’s sureness demands
justification by the rational state, which in turn requires the
subjective will of the individual to be in tune with it. Thus, the
rational state needs to provide objective freedom that the selfconscious subject can understand what is right and voluntarily
approve of it.25 Hegel sees individual satisfaction and freedom
unified when they conform to the “social ethos of an organic
community.26
However, if going against the standards set by the
rational state or criticizing the ruling regime is acting
irrationally, how are we to make sense of social critics and
reformers through a Hegelian lens? Dissidents like Aleksander
Solzhenitsyn and activists like Rev. King seem problematic,
nay, even an obstacle on Hegel’s model. To extend Singer’s
analogy, it seems that humanitarian advocates like Mahatma
Gandhi and Frederick Douglass are actually biting the hand
that feeds them by acting in their own self-interest. In the same
vein, a number of states throughout history have clearly
suppressed freedom on grounds they claimed to be “rational.”
The United States denied blacks the right to vote in 1960 in
“the interest of the nation as a whole.”27 The Soviet Union
denied people basic health care and living necessities “in the
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interest of the community.” 28 None of these significant
discriminatory legislative acts executed by states — all
executed in the name of the common good — help Hegel’s
case. If we approach the historical reality with Hegel’s
description of the rational state, it seems easy to justify actions
taken by governments that actually deny human dignity.
Given such events, it is no wonder that Rev. King said
in his I Have A Dream speech, “One hundred years later the
life of the Negro is still languished in the corners of American
society and finds himself in exile in his own land...there will
be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is
granted his citizenship rights.”29 In this speech, King not only
admits that his people do not feel “at home” in their society,
but advocates for political criticism for an indefinite time
period. But might Hegel view these lines as damning evidence
of Rev. King obstructing the strength of the rational state?
Hegel lays out the foundations for the possibility of
immanent critique in the requirements he sets for political
structures to be rational. Political structures are only rational
when they allow for three things: individuals must be able to
pursue their interests, feel at home within their communities,
and freely express their rational existence. Additionally, a
rational state must possess certain qualities: it must have laws
and institutions that secure basic life necessities, and its
subjects must be able to voluntarily support the laws and
understand the reasoning behind them.30
For a state to be rational, it must have laws that allow
individuals to pursue their interests.31 Recall Singer's original
body analogy. One’s legs may not guide his/her brain, but both
28
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need each other. Without the brain, the legs will die off, for
they will have no direction, and thus no function to perform.
In a hostile environment, without legs, the brain could die. The
brain does not simply ignore the pain its nervous system feels
when a leg is injured; rather, the pain signals the brain that
something must be done to protect the leg from danger.32 It is
a reciprocal relationship.
Building off that analogy, I contend that the
government actually needs to hear the voices of certain
reformers because they can warn the government of
impending danger, and allow the government to advance
forward in society. Without the peaceful protests of Rev. King,
America may not have benefited from African-American brain
trusts like the economist Thomas Sowell, the physicist Neil
DeGrasse Tyson, and the Associate Justice Thurgood
Marshall. Additionally, such brain trusts might want to
support the U.S. because, in some ways, it made possible their
successes: by providing quality educational access,
developing their identities through relationships they had, and
giving them meaning through virtuous service, the country, for
all its faults, ultimately allowed them to flourish. Following
that, if society does not have laws in place that allow for
individuals to freely pursue their interests without hindrance,
it will not progress, as it will not meet the output standards it
is capable of. By increasing suffrage universally, more groups
are able to express their interests, which should eventually
allow the groups to fulfill duties and make contributions to the
state at maximum capacity.
Thus, we can now see that all the requirements Hegel
sets forth for a state to be rational actually complement each
other: Hegel is not concerned with freedom to do as one
arbitrarily chooses; he is concerned with freedom to act
rationally in a way that actualizes your freedom as an
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individual. 33 Subjects in a state must be able to pursue the
interests that are rational to have so that they can express their
rational existence, which for Hegel is living freely. 34 It is
through the state that one develops an identity, one must
further pay debt to the State by serving it and understanding
that whatever duty they are voluntarily fulfilling for the State
under its laws are reasonable.35
But for citizens to perform their civic duties, they must
have health-care access, quality living conditions, and a route
to success unhindered by political discrimination. Hence, Rev.
King proclaims, “We can never be satisfied as long as our
bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging
in the motels of the highways and hotels of the cities! We can
never be satisfied as long as the Negro’s basic mobility is from
a smaller ghetto to a larger one.”36 In the previous quotations
is King’s contention that his people will be satisfied once they
have fair lodging and equal access to opportunities. Therefore,
if the United States does manage to genuinely secure those
standards for the disenfranchised, the disenfranchised will
naturally understand the laws as rational.
But for all of this to occur, the state must first meet all
the requirements. Since in the United States not everyone has
equal access to health care benefits, employment and
educational opportunities, or even legislative representation,
the state is not rational in a Hegelian sense of the term. As a
result, immanent critique by social reformers are actually
required for the state to progress at all. Therefore, while
Hegel’s totally rational state may not need immanent critique,
no state is rational until it has fulfilled its obligations to the
society that sustains it.37 In other words, until the rational state
has reached its ultimate goal, it’s telos, it must openly
33

Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 41.
Ibid, 77.
35
Ibid, 191.
36
King, Martin L., Jr. "I Have a Dream." Speech, 3.
37
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 272.
34

87

Furman Humanities Review
encourage immanent critique. The end of history is only
reached when all the requirements have been totally fulfilled.38
As such, I contend that social reformers are not
actually irrational according to Hegel, but rational beings who
progress the state, and that their social reform is actually the
fulfillment of the duty each subject — both the passive citizen
and active reformer — has to its community. This is precisely
why Rev. King declares proudly, “The marvelous new
militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not
lead us to distrust all white people, for many of our white
brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come
to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny.”39
However, Schopenhauer returns to object to my
response: when political theories are based on “constructive
histories, guided by a shallow optimism” the governments
they create “always ultimately end in a comfortable,
substantial, fat” degree of success for the regime, but whose
moral rectitude “remains essentially unaltered.” 40 In these
systems, the only form of social perfection is “intellectual
perfection” because of the philosophers that uphold the
standards of the immoral regime; no matter how abhorrent,
their philosophies justify the regime’s oppressive structures
with abstract concepts. 41 The disgruntled lecturer raises a
difficult challenge: could it be the case that Hegel’s logic is
simply a totalitarian system built on a consistent ideological
lie that coerces people into submission to the demands of the
state?
Though one can draw parallels, appropriating Hegel’s
system as totalitarian would be an oversimplification; his
thought avoids the charge of being totalitarian and prohibiting
38
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individual freedom because the state’s rationality is dependent
on all its citizens feeling at home inside the state. Hegel
realizes that freedom to do as one pleases often ends in
slavery.42 If one chooses to do something arbitrarily, there is
no rational justification behind it; one would simply be a slave
to his/her ego, instinct, or appetitive desires. But, as
distinguished scholar Pinkard points out, Hegel desires us to
be free from coercion by other humans as well, and not just by
natural desires and circumstances.43 An und für sich, In-andfor-itself, requires being at home with oneself by finding itself
in the other. 44 Self-awareness can only be achieved if one
recognizes other selves to make it aware: the state can only
reach self-awareness by allowing all the members of its body
to be free from coercion, which requires feeling at home in
their society.
Further, as Hegel views freedom as objective, it can
only be available to people when they act rationally according
to universal principles. 45 In a communist society, peoples’
choices only work for the good of the state — but since a
state’s justification for existence is supposed to be predicated
upon rationality, it would not even exist in the rational sense
if people were simply coerced into obeying its commands.46
Like the body, a state is not complete without its parts: if some
people are being tortured for the state to continue, the state is
not truly rationally justified, as its people are not able to
actualize freedom or feel “at home” within the state.47 If the
majority in society disregards the dignity of certain members
of society, the State has not developed to its potential.
42
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Accordingly, Rev. King proclaims, “We can never be satisfied
as long as our children are stripped of their adulthood and
robbed of their dignity by signs stating, ‘For White Only.’”48
Ultimately, I contend that Hegel does not deny the
dignity of the disenfranchised and disregard the criticisms of
social reformers like Rev. King and Solzhenitsyn, and that
Sittlichkeit is relevant to contemporary society. It is precisely
the opposite: Hegel acts as a call to action. In our society, we
cannot realize our own freedom if there are members of
society who are marginally oppressed. Without one of our vital
organs, we cannot function properly to survive. I conclude that
in reality, Hegel’s work truly endorses answering King’s call
in I Have A Dream:
Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of
God’s children...They have come to realize that their
freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. We
cannot walk alone. We cannot turn back...And if
America is to be a great nation, this must become true.
With this faith we will be able to work
together...knowing that we will be free one day. When
we allow freedom to ring, we...will be able to join
hands and sing…”Free at last, Free at last, thank God
a-mighty, We are free at last.49
48
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